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I. INTRODUCTION
Many people regard as essential to the transition from dicta-
torship to democracy the trial of those who have committed hu-
man rights abuses. The argument that punishment is a funda-
mental political tool that can raise the consciousness that is
essential to effect radical political change is justifiable on many
grounds. It is generally accepted that the judiciary (using the
power that originates from, and is administered under, the pro-
tection of the new government) can impartially allocate criminal
responsibility to those who have tortured and killed and can
thereby restore belief in individual liberties and can recreate
democratic authority.
Most critics of this thesis either justify or condone the vio-
lent dictatorial practices and argue either from practicality, from
moral skepticism, or from fear of deepening social conflict.
Those who fear deepening social conflict are concerned, among
other reasons, that this retributive justice may detract from the
political consensus required to create respect for rights and
equality. Recent experience in Argentina, however, suggests
that trials of human rights abusers may have reinforced the very
same authoritarian trends they were designed to overcome.
Thus, rather than destroying the political consensus, a new con-
sensus has been created, but unfortunately the new consensus
has adopted the methods of the old regime.
This essay explores how, beyond the rhetoric of "just pun-
ishment," structural features of post-dictatorial communities
remain, turning human rights trials into revenge-driven retalia-
tory ventures. Thus, instead of "de-authoritarianizing" and paci-
fying the polity, these retributive measures become an independ-
ent source of disunity and persecution. In fact, as the recent
history of Argentina indicates, the trials served to perpetuate
and encourage state-sponsored violence rather than to consoli-
date democratic institutions and customs. Argentines find
authoritarianism too familiar to successfully extricate them-
selves in the course of a few years from the social beliefs and
practices that are inherent to authoritarian regimes.
This essay sets out to expose the basic misconception that,
envisaged as they were in Argentina, trials and criminal pun-
ishment will improve respect for rights in post-dictatorial politi-
cal systems. In fact, the civic accountability for punishment in
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this context is fraught with insurmountable obstacles. This es-
say examines this idea and the ways in which the 1985 human
rights trials in Argentina do not seem to have consolidated
democratic institutions such as an independent judiciary, but
rather have done the opposite: they have eroded the public's
confidence in, and thus the power of, the already feeble authority
of the judiciary. I also look at the empirical evidence that
authoritarian practices still run rampant within that segment of
the Argentine community that still favors-or at least justifies-
state violence. I tackle what appears to be a contradiction be-
tween the popular support for the trials of human rights viola-
tors, on the one hand, and support of brutality on the other. It is
possible to view this contradiction as a result of a lack of political
authority that originated primarily under a terrorist state. I
claim that the very subjective nature of blame and punishment
is caused by an authoritarian practice of governance. Further, I
demonstrate how this distorted practice of blame can become a
lens through which we observe the Argentine human rights tri-
als. Ultimately, this practice of placing blame, as formalized by
the trials, turned into a form of revenge rather than "just pun-
ishment."
II. WHY PUNISH STATE CRIMINALS? DIGNITY, SELF- RESPECT
AND THE ABANDONMENT OF OLD PARADIGMS
Crime, punishment, and the criminal trials themselves are
among the central topics of discussion in most societies.1 This
same issue of crime and punishment becomes a collective obses-
sion when the culprits are members of brutal dictatorial regimes.
For example, human rights activists hounded Haitian president
Jean Bertrand Aristide to agree to prosecute military officers
and attaches as early as January 1994, months before Aristide
had even managed to return to Haitian soil. Top human rights
groups, including Amnesty International, found it imperative to
get Haiti's president to commit to the process of prosecuting and
punishing torturers and assassins. The reasons for such urgency
are not self-evident, considering that Haiti faces the worst pre-
dicament of malnutrition and lack of education in the Americas.
1. One has only to think of the effect of the O.J. Simpson trial on television
scheduling to understand this.
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Beyond deep-seated retributive emotions, the drive toward
punishment is tied to the entrenched belief that criminal justice
plays a central role in teaching us the truth2 about past deeds.3
In addition to Haiti, this belief was the catalyst behind popular
and international pressure to punish "state criminals" in Uru-
guay, Chile, Argentina, and now Rwanda. This belief is also re-
sponsible for retributive purges such as the Czechoslovakian
Lustration law, which bans Communist Party members from
holding public office.
There are indeed strong reasons to think that retributive
justice can contribute to establishing a rights-based, democratic
society. Perhaps most importantly, scholars and politicians link
punishment to the consolidation of democratic institutions,
chiefly the judiciary. This consolidation is in fact both the cause
and the consequence of minimally egalitarian law enforcement.
It seems only too obvious that trying state criminals in unstable
political systems affirms the principle that nobody is beyond the
reach of the law and that citizens have rights, the exercise of
which are essential to a working democracy. Moreover, it also
seems evident that punishment has a larger role than just
building and unifying democratic institutions through egalitar-
ian blame adjudicating mechanisms. Some scholars and most
human rights activists imply that the act of convicting human
rights violators serves a therapeutic function by instilling among
members of the community a lost sense of self-respect which is
the stepping stone for building respect for rights.
It is true that once dictatorships are over, individuals who
had suffered or feared state persecution are less likely to regain
respect for themselves or develop respect for others in the ab-
sence of prosecution and punishment of the transgressors. 4 Fur-
2. This teaching of history is, of course, contingent upon the fact that moral blame
for the gross infringements of rights under a dictatorship may be assigned to a clearly
identifiable group.
3. I later suggest that this point holds insofar as the retributive emotions in which
punishment is grounded stem from the drive to recover the citizens' lost dignity and self-
respect.
4. Amartya Sen points out that subjugated people will abandon their belief in their
own and other persons' rights in order to accommodate themselves to the attainment of
"small mercies." See generally AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 45 (1990) CA
person who has had a life of misfortune ... may be more easily reconciled to deprivations
than others reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances. [Subjugated people
may] take pleasures in small mercies, and manage to suppress intense suffering for the
necessity of continuing survival ... '.
[Vol. 29:3
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thermore, turning terrorized individuals into respectful and re-
sponsible citizens seems a pre-condition for creating democratic
institutions. This is true because the very existence of demo-
cratic institutions is contingent upon the respect they elicit
among the citizenry. The argument is sound: the first effect of
human rights trials-that of affirming authoritative democratic
institutions-is conditional upon the second-the inducement of
individuals to respect other persons' rights and choices-because
it is precisely the rights and preferences of the people that demo-
cratic institutions are intended to protect.
However, the drawbacks inherent to the holding trials of
human rights violators may override the potential theoretical
merits of retributive measures.5 The Argentine case overwhelm-
ingly supports this conclusion.
State terrorism obliterates our self-respect and distorts the
perception of our rights. Compromising our basic social solidar-
ity and our goals makes us feel shame;6 it also instills guilt in us
for deserting our loyalties. Our sense of worthlessness, of
shame, and of guilt, demand a "political remedy" to dignify us in
our own eyes. The affirmation by the governing institutions that
we were wronged will strongly contribute to self-legitimization.
Punishing those people who violated our rights is the clearest
and strongest statement that a governing institution may issue
to that effect. 7 Citizens need to learn and relearn that they have
rights, not only to be able to act on their own rights, but to re-
spect other people's rights as well. As a governing institution, it
5. Concededly, I was among the many people who advanced these very arguments
in support of the trials at the time.
6. By "shame" I here refer to the sentiment that stems from our incapacity to act
autonomously. Shame, thus, lies beyond responsibility for making the wrong choices. In
this view, shame comprises our lack of autonomy (that is, of choice itself). For an ac-
count of this emotion and its role in our construction of morality, see BERNARD WILLIAMS,
SHAME AND NECESSITY 75-102 (1993) ("The basic experience connected with shame is that
of being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition.").
7. A clear analogy is that of rape in a sexist society. If rapists are not convicted,
over time, raped women are likely to feel guilty as blameworthy participants in the
wrongdoing. See generally CAROL LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS, PER-
PETRATORS & RESPONSIBILITY 22-55 (1996) (arguing that an exclusively external view of
blame is problematic because it both underestimates the validity of what the victim is
saying and poses a contradiction between the social-forces account and the possibility for
change). In that predicament, a woman needs an institutional response to the wrongdo-
ing to support her dignity. Criminal punishment owes its strength (and also its weak-
ness as we shall see) to its simplistic, dual nature.
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seems clear that punishment must play this role,8 but to do so
requires a conception of punishment that is not "perpetrator-
centered." In this essay I criticize traditional standard theories
of deterrence and full-blooded retributivism and propose a
"victim-centered" theory.
Simple, standard legal criteria do not adequately justify
punishment because trying and ultimately punishing human
rights abusers involves normative decisions. 9 The appropriate
time to try state criminals is frequently one of transition from
authoritarian military dictatorship to civilian rule; it is a time of
momentous political and social shifts. This political situation
demands that the decision to try human rights violators take
into account a complex set of normative facts and chiefly estab-
lish the criteria for striking down some sorts of dictatorial rule-
setting. Primarily, politicians must decide what to do with self-
amnesties and immunity agreements usually concocted during
the authoritarian rule. They must also settle the status of pris-
oners held in connection with political repression and convictions
grounded in the criminal rules enacted during the authoritarian
regime. Holding the trials itself presupposes a decision to nullify
certain de facto rules: trial and punishment connote the invali-
dation of rules that once enabled the authoritarian regime to en-
gage in terrorism, in repressive practices, or in canceling the
eventual responsibility of those who envisaged and conducted
those practices.
A. Deterrence and the Trials
Authors who regard the causal consequences of punishment
(i.e., deterrence) as the grounds for its justification will find that
convicting state criminals fails to support their theoretical claim.
Punishment may deter top officers from staging a new military
coup. As some Argentine dictators have discovered, being ex-
posed as criminals at home and in front of the international
community is a bitter experience. Following the courts' convic-
8. Though narrowly linked to power, punishment also embodies authority. This
becomes evident when we attempt to discriminate between state punishment and other
forms of state coercion. See RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY AND THE AUTHORITATIVE 157 (1980).
9. The sheer size of the state criminality in Argentina commands us to reexamine
the grounds for punishment.
[Vol. 29:3422
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tions, very few officers would have liked to have stood in the
shoes of the convicted Argentine military commanders. How-
ever, the deterrent effect of criminal convictions is inadequate to
overcome the fear of the dictatorial state violence.
This deterrent effect is considerably attenuated for the mili-
tary community at large. At best, the deterrent consequences of
punishment apply only to the generals of the highest rank.
Stringent organizational and time factors interfere with the de-
terrent effects of punishment. The lower an officer's rank, the
tighter his bonds of comradeship and the stronger the peer pres-
sure will be to perpetrate murder and to abuse prisoners. Time,
on the other hand, decisively affects the intensity of our incen-
tives. For most officers, fear of a conviction at some indefinite
time in the future is largely neutralized by the immediate bene-
fits that violating others' rights brings about: respect and sup-
port from companions and senior officers. In Argentina, the
prospect of possible future punishment was apparently overrid-
den by the immediate rewards from the transgressor's immedi-
ate circle. Very few officers retained their pre-war moral com-
mitments and disapproved of what their companions were
doing.' 0 Further, even if the leaders of an authoritarian political
power structure are able to safeguard the continuity of their eco-
nomic and political trends through democracy, the issue of per-
sonal accountability may still create a barrier to the transition to
democracy.11
In the case of Argentina's military cadres, the deterrent ef-
fect of the prosecutions would not have succeeded in the face of a
fanaticized military. During the apogee of state terror, those of-
ficers who deviated on moral grounds from the general policy of
torture and assassination were accused by their companions of
acting out of complacency and cowardice. Officers who sup-
10. But even the deterrent effect of prosecutions and convictions at the top of the
hierarchy would still be limited by circumstantial reasons. For example, if the military
should overthrow the government in the future, the deterrent effect of punishment would
probably discourage them from surrendering their power to a democratic successor, as
they had done. According to some experts, after the Argentine trials were underway, the
Chilean and Uruguayan military became reluctant to call for elections and, when they
did, they took the necessary steps to have politicians grant them immunity.
11. See generally Adam Przeworski, Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Con-
flicts, in CONSTITUTIONAUSM AND DEMOCRACY 59, 59-80 (Jon Elster et al. eds., 1988)
(discussing the inherent difficulties in establishing a democracy coupled with the addi-
tional difficulties of devoluting the power of an authoritarian regime).
1998] 423
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
ported democracy encountered a great deal of hostility. 12 Thus, a
strong sense of loyalty to one's comrades weakens the effects of
criminal convictions as one descends the military hierarchical
pyramid. Institutional instability in Argentina weakened the
hypothetical deterrent effects of punishment. Junior officers as-
sume that, in the worst case where punishment is actually im-
posed, the military will retain enough clout to secure amnesties
or pardons in either the short or long run. The plausibility of
this belief is supported by history in the four military mutinies
staged in Argentina since the return of civilian rule. These mu-
tinies were staged in support of those convicted or only prose-
cuted of human rights violations and against the generals who
betrayed their junior officers to the civilian courts.
B. Retributivists and the Trials
Retributivism is an alternative justification for punishment
of human rights abusers. The practical effects that support the
retributivist theory of justification of human rights trials are no
more persuasive than those that support the deterrence theory.
Retributivists may consider the effects of punishment, but ignore
all possible consequences of the criminal sanction as relevant to
its justification. The message to the wrongdoer is: "[t]his is how
12. The best known of these groups was called Centro de Militares Democraticos
Argentinos (CEMIDA). CEMIDA was a minute group of democratic military officers,
most of them retired, who opposed the military regime and, most of all, the violence it
resorted to. CEMIDA officers, however, were a very special clique. Colonel Augusto Rat-
tembach, for instance, is a musician and a composer. Some of them have since acknowl-
edged that, had they been in active service, their negative reaction to the Dirty War may
have been different due to fears of total isolation. Interview with Colonel Jos6 Luis Gar-
cia, one of the founders of CEMIDA (July 1992). Considered disloyal by their colleagues,
CEMIDA officers suffered bomb attacks and endless death threats. Moreover, in 1991,
after President Menem pardoned the few officers who were still serving in jail, retired
army Colonel Juan-Jaime Cesio was barred from wearing his uniform for having en-
dorsed human rights organization complaints. Such a stigmatizing sanction was never
imposed upon officers indicted for torture or murder, and these officers later benefited
from the Full Stop of 1986 and the Due Obedience law of 1987, and Menem's pardons of
October 1989 and December 1990. Interview with General Ernesto Lopez-Meyer, at the
CEMIDA (Sept. 17, 1989). A similar sanction befell army General Carlos Dominguez
who was forced into retirement simply for airing his belief that "law and order cannot be
established by systematically breaking the law," a strategy which, according to Dom-
inguez, rendered the brutality of left-wing insurgency irrelevant. See JAMES NEILSON,
EL FIN DE UNA QUIMERA AUGE Y OCASO DE LA ARGENTINA POPULISTA 241 (Buenos Aires,
1991).
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wrong what you did was."' 3 Retributive factors-the harm done
or the culpability of the actor-are moral limits on the way we
are allowed to treat others. They act as tools for promoting of
social and state interests. Retributivism places rigid constraints
on society against using punishment of individuals as a means
for promoting other people's interests. Punishment itself is an
act of justice to which all members of society are morally com-
mitted. For a full-blooded retributivist, punishment is de-
manded of every military officer who participated in violations of
human rights, even if it precipitates a new military revolt.
In this retributivist scenario, an individual is punished ac-
cording to a specified set of conditions-in this case, the Argen-
tine criminal law. Further, every person who satisfies these pre-
scribed conditions warrants an established painful consequence.
For adherents of such a thesis, punishment must be imposed on
all officers who ordered, perpetrated, or aided a violation, on
those who failed to avert or report the transgression, and on the
civilians who aided and abetted the regime in a wide variety of
ways. For example, in accordance with this view, some human
rights organizations such as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo cam-
paigned to have every officer who participated in human rights
infringement punished. 14 The Madres also sought the prosecu-
tion and punishment of all confederates, including Catholic
priests who encouraged torture and assassination. Although
there is some appeal to consequences in the Madres' rhetoric,
this appeal is not based on social effects, but rather on moral or
evaluative consequences. In demanding that their children be
returned alive and that all those responsible for any violations
(irrespective of how minor the violation) be punished, the
Madres' claim that societies, qua societies, require minimal jus-
tice. Furthermore, so long as this justice is not carried out by
punishing the abductors, torturers, and assassins, the Madres
cannot accept that their children are dead. If they did, they
would be admitting that human rights abusers are accepted by
13. ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 370 (1981).
14. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo is a group of mothers of youths forced to disap-
pear during the military dictatorship. Staunchly denouncing the human rights abuses
perpetrated during 1976-1983, the Madres paraded around the square that sits across
the street from the Government House in Buenos Aires wearing white scarfs. This group
became an important organization in the late seventies. Though currently split, it is still
active today. See generally JO FISHER, CLAIMS OF THE MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO,
MOTHERS OF THE DISAPPEARED (1989).
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society, rendering that society non-existent as a moral commu-
nity.
Retributivism has a genuine democratic appeal because it
stands for equality and for constraints upon the state's power to
repress individuals. A central feature of a system of constraints
is generality: all guilty perpetrators ought to be punished even if,
as Immanuel Kant postulated, the sky falls.
There is yet another objection that would disqualify retribu-
tivists even if we ignore the requirement that social institutions
be useful: in overlooking the effects of the criminal sanction, a
full-blooded retributivist must, perhaps dogmatically, believe in
the intrinsic value of the rules that render the act criminal.
"Just punishment" presupposes that the rules that render an act
punishable are also just. But the full-blooded retributivist can-
not discriminate between just and unjust rules without looking
at the consequences of enforcing such rules as the ultimate rea-
son for their existence. It makes no sense to elect to punish cer-
tain conduct as criminal without considering the consequences of
such conduct and the expected effects of making those who carry
it out criminally responsible. 5
By a similar tack, ignoring consequences will render a
retributivist unable to give a suitable answer to the question of
"why punish at all?" Based on the inability of retributivists to
regard consequences, H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls have adopted
similar strategies to make this point. First, as H.L.A. Hart has
pointed out, pure retributivists cannot appeal to considerations
of social usefulness.1 6 Taking into account the social advantage
of convictions would make the justification of punishment
depend in part on its consequences, thereby abandoning the full-
blooded retributivist's basic tenet. Similarly, John Rawls claims
that "[a]ll ethical doctrines worth our attention take
consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did
not would simply be irrational, crazy." 17 Second, it is not self-
evident that the wrongdoing to which we attach a criminal
sanction demands that the offender be made to suffer. If no
particular desirable consequences are associated with the
15. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PMTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1990).
16. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 1 (1968).
17. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971).
[Vol. 29:3
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transgressor's suffering, we might prefer to refrain from
punishing wrongdoers and elect to impose upon them a duty to
compensate the victim instead.
C. Revenge, Punishment, and Victim-Centered
Retribution
I do not claim that the classical utilitarian and retributive
theories do not provide grounds for punishing state criminals.
For example, it is correct to expect that criminal convictions have
dissuasive effects. But, at most, these effects extend to only a
few officers at the top of the authoritarian regime. Further, ret-
ributivists provide a cogent argument for protecting individual
rights: persons who are not guilty of a wrongful act ought not be
punished regardless of the loudness of the popular outcry.' 8 Yet
this negative aspect of retributivism is modest; it refers solely to
restraints on the utilization of punishment. It does not offer a
positive justification for criminal convictions. Thus, it is clear
that standard theories of punishment cannot justify punishing
the perpetrators.
Perhaps one ought to argue for ad hoc, rather than general
justificatory theories, addressed at nothing more and nothing
less than specifically punishing human rights violators (i.e., that
in post-dictatorial systems, punishment pacifies society). If vio-
lators are not punished, some authors claim, those connected
with the disappeared will take revenge on the perpetrators. 9
Under this view, refraining from punishing state criminals may
steer society towards a state of nature A la Hobbes. But this
seems to be an incorrect assumption, at least in post-military
Argentina where not a single member of human rights associa-
tions with whom I interviewed revealed that they would ever
take revenge. Beyond verbal and minor physical aggression on a
few military officers, no revenge was ever attempted in Argen-
tina in spite of the modest achievements of two post-dictatorial
administrations. The Uruguayan and Chilean experiences seem
to point in the same direction. Indeed, possible revenge does not
seem to be a problem in spite of the lack of criminal prosecu-
tions, let alone convictions, in these countries. However, al-
18. See J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3
nn. 1-4 (1982).
19. See, e.g., CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996).
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though both the standard and the ad hoc theses fail to account
for punishing human rights criminals, intuitively, there still
seem to be good reasons for punishing based on the suffering of
the survivors of the Dirty War.
I have argued that punishment should contribute to the
creation of a rights-based democracy. I have also suggested that
institutional regard for the victims of state-sponsored crime is
crucial to the furtherance of that goal. In that respect, deter-
rence and full-blooded retributivism are, as "perpetrator-
centered" theories, intrinsically inappropriate. Additionally, ex-
perience has ruled out the ad hoc revenge-averting approach
which, in not having been systematically articulated, requires no
theoretical response. There are, on the other hand, theoretical
reasons to assume that the victims' friends and relatives of the
disappeared may give up on revenge. 20 I propose a "victim-
centered" justification of punishment, one based on relevant
(worthy of respect) moral emotions, as the most plausible, inde-
pendent ground to warrant the conviction of human rights abus-
ers.
Redress for victims is not essential for a deterrence-based
justification. By giving special significance to the deterrence of
potential offenders, deterrence theorists have no qualms about
overlooking the plight of those who have suffered degradation
from having their basic rights infringed upon or threatened. The
notion of "justice for the victims" would be excluded from the de-
terrence calculus when exercising discretion. 21 Full-blooded ret-
ributivists invite a similar criticism. By disregarding all conse-
quences of punishment, proponents of this version of
20. Beyond experience, there are theoretical grounds for claiming that the relatives
of the disappeared have reasons to dismiss revenge. What these indirect victims of hu-
man rights abuses seek is an authority, a referee to provide an impartial account accord-
ing to which they are not responsible for the death of their loved ones. From a psycho-
logical approach, Sharon Lamb refers to this need as one of the goals of the victims of
domestic abuse. LAMB, supra note 7, at 22-55.
21. Utilitarians may adopt the view that deterrence and reformation of the criminal
are but two aspects to consider in the pursuit of overall social utility. A broader view of
such utility may demand computing the welfare of the direct and indirect victims of
crime. This approach, however unusual, may have some appeal when, as in the case of
Argentina's terrorist state, the victims (people killed, tortured, and terrorized) were in
the millions. The weakness of such an approach, however, lies in its own limitation
when there are only a few victims. In that case, their interest in regaining full member-
ship in their community may give way to preponderant interests that their cases be
sealed. For an assortment of ways of defining deterrence, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 74-89 (1973).
[Vol. 29:3
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retributivism are only concerned that the wrongdoer face the
consequence of his deeds.
But there is another, less popular variant of retributivism-
a goal-oriented variant. According to this version, punishment
ought to be directed at redressing the valued sentiments of those
who were wronged. I do not have vindictive sentiments in mind;
I am considering the victim's loss of purpose and sense of worth.
As I have explained previously, those who endured unwarranted
actual or potential chastisement from the oppressor experience
shame and lack of self-respect for renouncing the personal ideals
that made their life meaningful. Goal-oriented retributivists will
attach to punishment the function of restoring this lost trust.
What distinguishes this goal from those of deterrence and other
goal-based theories is that the former result from evaluative
considerations, from contemplating what analytically ensues
from the very notion of punishment, rather than from the
"causal" external relationships. Reducing the survivors' shame
and guilt is not an "external" consequence of criminal convic-
tions, but rather an aspect of the convictions themselves.
Similarly, there is a difference between full-blooded and vic-
tim-centered retributivists. While the former are compelled to
impose punishment given the presence of a set of conditions that
render an act criminal, such generality does not apply to victim-
oriented retributivists. In seeking redress for the victims, they
may consistently choose to forego punishment or content them-
selves with merely condemning the offender, or solely the of-
fender's deed, if they believe that exacting pain upon the perpe-
trator will do nothing substantial to restore the victim's self-
respect and confidence. So, if the victims of certain forms of
state crimes have already regained self-respect, and are confi-
dent that they will be protected against future violations because
the heads of the criminal organization have been convicted, vic-
tim-centered retributivists may refrain from punishing other
members of the group. There is room for considerable discretion.
Although this victim-centered justification for punishing
state criminals is certainly the most plausible, it is not intended
to be exclusionary, and consequently, it does not attempt to dis-
place other justifying reasons as applicable to criminal punish-
ment in general. A victim-centered view may recognize the futil-
ity of imposing a criminal sanction on a certain offender, yet
punishing this offender may still be suitable if, for example, cir-
1998]
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cumstances indicate that punishment will deter potential imita-
tors. I have in mind the large number of rapes of female political
detainees which-unlike summary executions, torture, and ab-
ductions-elicited general disapproval from the military cadres.
Rape was viewed as a "common crime," rather than as an effec-
tive response to political necessity, thus making offenders re-
garded by their peers as "common" criminals. 22 There is still
more to be said for the dignity pursuant to justification of pun-
ishment.
The applicdbility of a victim-based justification is not limited
to establishing a rights-based democracy. It may also play a key
role in improving the state of individual liberties in already ex-
isting rights-based societies. Since this approach is strongly
connected with the offender shaming his victim, the thesis may
also serve the purpose of justifying punishment of particularly
humiliating transgressions, such as blackmail and enslavement.
I contend that a "victim-centered" theory of punishment is,
prima facie, the most significant means to the democratization of
society.
D. Did the Trials Further the Democratic Cause?
The question cannot, obviously, elicit a straightforward an-
swer, for there is no way to establish the degree to which the
1985 Argentine human rights trials of army officers may have
aided democracy. Nonetheless, there are strong indicators that
the trials of the generals failed to teach the Argentine citizenry
the value of their own worth as individuals. This assertion sug-
gests that the reason for the failure lies in the meaning attached
to the convictions. The failure, however, is not a result of
grounding the convictions in retributivist or utilitarian princi-
ples. There are indeed powerful objections even against the vic-
tim-centered justification discussed previously.
To attach a democratizing effect to the prosecution and
punishment of state criminals presupposes that the courts' deci-
sions are authoritative, and that a large enough section of the
citizenry believes the courts are competent to unravel the truth
and committed to fostering respect for rights--including, of
22. Interview with Mohamed All Seineldin, Ex-Colonel, in the military prison in
Magdalena, Buenos Aires, Arg. (July 1992).
[Vol. 29:3
FOSTERING DEMOCRACY
course, those of the culprits. Convictions only contribute to re-
storing the citizens' lost dignity insofar as the populace assumes
that, beyond satisfying retributive emotions, the courts are im-
partial and that convictions are grounded in shared notions of
moral responsibility. Indeed, one cannot expect the courts to in-
still any sense of worth and self-respect among citizens if the
same courts fail to meet some popular sense of minimal impar-
tiality and prudence. 23 It is at this point that simple retribution
based in vengeance deviates from a respect-seeking function of
punishment based upon authoritative power.
The plausibility of punishment is, in spite of the dignity-
based rationale, only apparent. Indeed, the policy of trying state
criminals has inevitable weaknesses. First, experience and
common sense demonstrate the difficulties of selecting those to
be brought to trial. Given the size and political implications of
state crime, there is an inevitable air of artificiality in establish-
ing the boundaries of responsibility among members of a terror-
ridden society. By pinning the blame on a limited sector of soci-
ety, human rights trials cannot escape re-inventing history. The
meaning of the resulting "truth" inevitably becomes controver-
sial, if not plainly factious. Dissatisfaction with the 1985 Ar-
gentine trials was conveyed not only by those who defended the
convicted officers, but also by front-line human rights activists
such as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and several international
organizations. While the former claimed the culprits were
scapegoats, the latter protested that too few were actually con-
victed and that their sentences were too light. For both parties,
the trials were "clearly political": they were inadmissibly lenient
for some, and imposed undeserved punishments (perceived as
"revenge") for the others. 24 As a result, far from administering
justice, the judiciary was widely perceived to have merely ad-
justed to the political convenience of the executive. Accordingly,
23. I contend that restoration of self-respect requires that we are told what we as-
sume is true about past events. Only "blind retribution" (largely revenge) will conform
itself with punishing a wrongdoer. The relevance of being told that we are not guilty of
the pain someone caused must be the consequence of an authoritative (neutral) account
of the nature of the wrongdoing.
24. It must be borne in mind that not a single military officer I interviewed was
flatly opposed to the trials. But, although there was consensus that some human rights
trials were justified, there was no agreement on who the culprits should have been.
Some thought it was the generals at the top. Others thought it was those who acted out
of personal emotions such as greed, yet others favored punishing older and more experi-
enced soldiers.
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instead of reinforcing whatever authority the judiciary may have
mustered, the trials had the opposite effect: instead of contribut-
ing to bridging a fragmented society's multiple versions of real-
ity, the courts generated the belief that the trials were a ploy to
draw consensus from a compromised account of reality.
Whereas some felt the government failed to do enough about
past human rights violations, others, including a sizable number
of military officers and right-wing civilians, perceived that
President Alfonsin and a group of "acolytes" (which included me),
were determined to destroy the country's traditions. Indeed,
they thought that by bringing the whole military apparatus to
trial indiscriminately, the president was deliberately damaging
the armed forces. 25 This fragmentation of public opinion brought
about all kinds of popular demonstrations to press the admini-
stration to prosecute a larger number of officers. It also pro-
voked four military rebellions aimed at stopping the trials. I be-
lieve that the meaning of the trials was distorted by the social
conception of blame.
Thus, perceived as compromising justice for some citizens,
and implementing a fallacious notion of blame by most citizens,
the trials deepened the antagonism between conflicting factions.
The most striking feature about this fragmentation of public
opinion is that hardly anybody, including lawyers, based their
opinions of the 1985 federal court decision on the criminal re-
sponsibility of the members of the ruling military juntas. The
court found five of the nine members of the first three juntas re-
sponsible for the assassinations, torture, rape, and larceny
committed by subaltern personnel during the military dictator-
ship. Not even the Supreme Court's verdict delivered one year
later, which essentially upheld the federal court's decision, was
relevant to the citizenry's assessment of the country's recent po-
litical history. The populace's indifference to the proceedings
shows that, in Argentina, judicial decisions lack authoritative-
ness both in establishing the facts brought to trial and in evalu-
ating the significance of these facts. Thus, controversy over
25. A good example of this interpretation is the work of journalists Jorge Grecco
and Gustavo Gonzalez. See JORGE GREcco & GUSTAVO GONZALEZ, ARGENTINA: EL
EJERCITO QUE TENEMOS 140 (1990). Despite the lack of empirical support for many of the
assertions that resulted from the investigation, the book was successful to the extent
that it was awarded in that same year the first prize in 'Essays and Journalistic Investi-
gations." This award is the most important distinction for research journalism in Ar-
gentina.
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what should have been done about past human rights violations
goes on and on with no hope that any arbiter will bring it to an
end. The hope that history will bridge the gap is of little conso-
lation because some people believe, as I do, that the authority of
the courts to avert future abuses is indispensable here and now.
E. Post-Trial Argentina
As with most dictatorships, the Argentine authoritarian, of-
ficial mind of the 1970s concocted a political world sharply split
between enemies and allies. The military and its allies took
their first step toward implanting a rigid, bipolar logic by defin-
ing their ultimate goal as that of routing an extremely vague
category, "subversion."
Extrapolated from the concept of "the enemy" in the wars in
Indochina and Algeria, "subversion" in Argentina applied to a
wide social segment. As governmental speeches and harangues
of those times reflect, the term "subversive" was applied not only
to the guerrillas and the terrorists but also to an extremely wide
range of citizens that the regime considered a threat. For ex-
ample, an admiral's list of characters that he considered
"subversive" included the following: "the ideologues, the corrupt,
the inauthentic leaders, the irresponsible, the economic delin-
quents and the false preachers."26 In adopting an apocalyptic
version of the "Marxist threat," the regime's war eliminated the
logical possibility of remaining neutral; the indifferent and the
ignorant were also candidates to the seduction of "international
Marxism." As in Algeria and Indochina, potential enemies of the
French were those who simply did not support the crusade or its
terrorist methods. 27 Consequently, lawyers, physicians, nuns,
priests, relatives, and acquaintances of political activists were
among those arrested and even tortured and killed. "There are
no ignorant," decried a military delegate of the military junta,
Buenos Aires governor, General Iberico Saint Jean, "there are
only accomplices." 28 Thus, from both formal and informal con-
versations, it is clear that the enemy sector also encompassed
26. LA NACI6N (Buenos Aires), May 12, 1977 (quoting Admiral Luis Mendia).
27. The Argentine notion of subversion originated in France during the 1950s.
Thus, the term was tailored after the war in Algeria. This fact about language and con-
cepts does not detract from the heavy influence of the U.S. notion of national security.
28. LA OPINION (Buenos Aires), May 29, 1978.
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the "ideologues," the "defeatists," the "unconvinced," and many
more.
Insofar as society is one in which a large conspiracy threat-
ens to steal away the ignorant and the indifferent, the thin line
between authoritarianism and totalitarianism wanes. The proc-
ess of equating ignorance and skepticism with active opposition
to the anti-subversive crusade made neutrality between state
right-wing extremism and "subversion" impossible. No one con-
veyed the non-existence of neutrality better than General Saint
Jean. He made it clear that it was logical to split the world be-
tween black and white: "We will first kill all the insurgents,
later, we will kill those who collaborate with them, then we will
kill those who remain indifferent and, finally, we will kill the
shy."29  The rhetoric's appeal to violence was clearly demon-
strated by the thousands of citizens who were tortured or disap-
peared. Although paramount violence stopped in the early
1980s, its appeal is still quite strong.
In the Argentina of the 1990s, violence is, by and large, still
appealing to a large portion of the citizenry. This is apparent
from the reaction of public figures to challenging political events,
as well as from the political success of individuals espousing
authoritarian ideals. This success is also perceptible in the elec-
torate, tainted by violent associations and by the general accep-
tance, if not plain encouragement, of police abuse.
In fact, official rhetoric still resounds with dictatorial
phrasing. In July 1992, for instance, President Carlos Menem
claimed that students who rallied against his educational poli-
cies could soon be made to disappear as had thousands of sus-
pected dissidents during the military dictatorship.3 0 In 1994, the
President reacted similarly to media coverage of the alleged
killing of an army conscript by his superiors in the course of a
drill. Menem accused the journalists covering the case of pro-
moting a "class struggle" and the "division of the armed forces."31
With the same oratory as that of his military predecessors, Me-
29. See Carlos H. Acufia & Catalina Smulovitz, Ni Olvido, ni Perdon: Derechos hu-
manos y tensiones civico militares en la transicion argentina (paper submitted at the XVI
International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington D.C.,
Apr., 1991).
30. HERALD (Buenos Aires), July 10, 1992.
31. Menem dijo que hay sectores que estdr incitando a la "lucha de clases, " CLARIN
(Buenos Aires), Apr. 30, 1994, at 10.
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nem added that those sectors that now promoted the investiga-
tion had remained silent when the violence originated in ultra-
left-wing sectors.3 2 Yet Menem's response, couched in the same
authoritarian style as that adopted by many of his followers, was
not in and of itself incompatible with a working democracy.
What is in fact irreconcilable with basic democratic reactions to
dissent were the repercussions of these words among the popu-
lace. Immediately after the President's denunciations, the
"subversive" demonstrations shrunk to roughly one-fourth of
what they had been. Likewise, journalists stopped reporting on
suspicious military affairs.
On August 14, 1993, state-tolerated violence erupted once
more in Argentina's public life, when an organized gang of brow-
beaters assailed spectators who jeered at Menem to protest
against his administration's economic policies. Journalists cov-
ering the events were also the victims of the violence and some of
them had their cameras smashed against the ground. Reminis-
cent of the military dictatorship's Dirty War tactics, the area
where the president addressed the crowd seemed to have become
a "free zone." The thugs enjoyed an immunity similar to that of
the anti-subversive gangs in the 1970s. Indeed, not one single
assailant was arrested in spite of the police and other security
personnel deployed in the area.33 Some researchers believe that
some of the thugs had operated among the army's death squads
and "task forces" that abducted and killed thousands during the
military dictatorship. 34 After publishing a note in Buenos Aires
newspaper Pdgina 1235 explaining how these browbeaters were
recruited at the Mercado Central (the city's distribution market)
on August 19, a journalist named Hernan Lopez Echague, was
severely beaten. In what clearly seems a preemptive strike
.against reporters' perceived intrusiveness, a second reporter's
face was slashed with a switchblade. President Menem and
Eduardo Duhalde, his former vice-President, did not reveal the
slightest alarm.36 They nonchalantly attributed the violence to
32. Id.
33. See LA NACION (Buenos Aires), Aug. 19, 1993, at 7.
34. See Laura Termine et al., Las jaulas abiertas, NOTICAS, Sept. 5, 1993, at 72.
35. See PAGINA 12, (Buenos Aires), Aug. 22, 1993.
36. Eduardo Duhalde is now the governor of the Buenos Aires province, the largest
in the country. In October 1997, days away from a congressional election, Duhalde ac-
cused the opposition of "de-stabilizing the province" and of bringing about a "pre-
subversive" situation. See HERALD (Buenos Aires), Oct. 6, 1997.
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passing partisan political passions that, like the cold weather,
would soon fade away. 37
The second reminder of the country's authoritarianism is the
electoral performance of figures associated with the military dic-
tatorship such as retired General Domingo Bussi. The generars
despotic style, it is widely said, caused the deaths of many civil-
ians. Bussi is allegedly-either directly or indirectly-
responsible for abuses ranging from the summary execution of
abducted suspects of "subversion"3 8 to the violent removal of
shanty town dwellers. To cleanse Tucuman from layoffs, these
dwellers were literally shoved from army trucks in the bordering
province of Catamarca. To advance his political aims during the
dictatorship, Bussi also extorted money from industrialists by
constantly threatening them with reprisals. In spite of these
past actions (or perhaps because of them) the general was
elected governor of the northern province of Tucuman in the last
election.
Another example of the appeal of former dictators is that of
retired Colonel David Ruiz Palacios, who commanded the coun-
try's Federal Police as the dictatorship's Deputy Minister of the
Interior. In the 1991 elections, Ruiz was favored to win the
elections by a landslide in the Chaco province. When Ruiz was
barred from running because he lacked the formal requisite
years of residence in the state, he hand-picked his own substi-
tute who easily won the elections. 9
37. See James Neilson, La lucha es cruel, NOTIcIAs (Buenos Aires), Sept. 12, 1993,
at 76. It is interesting to note that officials were not even disturbed by the thugs' attack.
Present at the scene, Secretary of Agriculture, Felipe Solfi, candidly explained to the
press that the attacks "were caused" by those who had attended the inauguration "to in-
sult the President." (television broadcast, on Aug. 16, 1993.) Witness to the beating of
journalists, President Menem's former ambassador to Honduras, Alberto Brito Lima,
disclosed a similar view. The violence, Brito Lima stated, was a "logical reaction to the
press' unfair reports." PAGINA 12 (Buenos Aires), Aug. 18, 1993. For those familiar with
recent Argentine history, Brito's statements did not come as a surprise: Brito was aUeg-
edly present at the massacre of young left wing Peronista militants awaiting Peron's ar-
rival from Spain in June 1973. See EUGENiO BENJAMIN MENDEZ, CONFESIONES DE UN
MONTONERO: LA OTRA CARA DE LA HISTORIA 81 (3rd ed., 1986). Thus, his assessment that
"there was something they must have done to bring the beating upon themselves" was
indeed foreseeable.
38. Among the firsthand sources I was able to interview was a high National Gen-
darmerie ("Gendarmeria Nacionar') officer whom I interviewed during the middle of
1992.
39. See PAGINA 12 (Buenos Aires), Aug. 16, 1991.
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Further, in the 1990s, a large portion of Argentine society
again accepts the use of torture. A large portion of the citizenry
accepts the inhumane treatment of suspects when such treat-
ment is employed to protect the security and property of "decent
citizens from a growing street criminality." For example, a
crowd staged a demonstration in the suburbs of Buenos Aires in
support of police officer Luis Patti when Patti was indicted for
torturing prisoners under investigation.40 Moreover, the forensic
experts declared on Patti's behalf that the detainees may well
have harmed themselves--even those who sustained injuries
from electrified wires-to cast blame on their captors. A Buenos
Aires journal reports that the country's public opinion was split
between those who considered Patti a torturer and those who
considered him a defender of security.41 In districts where he
had served, Patti's reputation for brutality earned him the
blessings of a vast section of the population. Turned into a pub-
lic figure, the policeman became a frequent guest at social
events, including a television show where he danced the tango
before millions of spectators. Patti declared that he "[n]ot only
makes people dance but also dances himself."42 This was a ma-
cabre pun because "dancing" in military and para-military jargon
means suffering inflicted pain. Furthermore, Patti's reputation
induced President Menem to choose him for special assignments.
It would be naive to conclude from the example of Patti that
Argentines are particularly tolerant of, or even devoted to, ex-
treme violence. There are sadistic and violent policemen every-
where, and people who justify them are not so hard to come by;
but there is more than this to Patti's story. After his indictment,
President Menem selected Patti to investigate the Maria Soledad
case in the northern province of Catamarca. The case is one in
which a minor was raped and eventually killed, and the suspects
were a host of local and national politicians and ranch owners.
Besides showing his callousness, Menem's choice proved to be
unwise. Patti befuddled the investigation and many conjecture
he helped a suspect to flee. Yet these circumstances did not hin-
der the officer's fresh political career; Patti is presently serving
40. PAGINA 12 (Buenos Aires), Sept. 14, 1990.
41. AMBITO FINANCIERO (Buenos Aires), Oct. 19, 1990.
42. Patti made this statement when asked to dance on a television show (Channel
9, Silvio Soldan's show in Buenos Aires.); Argentina's vice-president, Eduardo Duhalde,
pointed out that Patti was a "model for policemen." See HERALD (Buenos Aires), Aug. 8,
1991. See also PAGINA 12 (Buenos Aires), Sept. 14, 1991.
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as the mayor of San Miguel, a middle class neighborhood in the
outskirts of Buenos Aires. Thus, together with considerations
stated above, Patti offers a clear example of Argentina's linger-
ing propensities.
The preceding evidence illustrates that the trials of the mili-
tary did not accomplish their intended purpose. The President
and his faction's intimidating rhetoric, the political appeal that
ultra-right-wing officers enjoy since the 1991 elections, the pres-
ent indifference toward current police abuses, 48 and the enduring
impact of threats on the populace all suggest that authoritarian
ideals and methods still prevail. The perplexing point about the
previous examples of authoritarianism lies in the fact that many
of those who recently rallied to have torturers brought to justice
are now supportive of the same practices they condemned. This
contradiction demonstrates that the human rights trials did not
reflect the country's abomination of violence. It also indicates
that the trials did not achieve the goal of fostering reliable demo-
cratic values among Argentina's society. The trial and conviction
of the generals failed to instill the democratic notion of the su-
premacy of individual worth and responsibility. Further, the
trials and convictions did not teach Argentine society that some
things we do to people are unjustifiable, save, perhaps, in cases
of extreme necessity.
F. The Failure of the Trials
There are three factors that largely explain the failure of the
trials to help bring about changes in the direction of a rights-
based democracy. These factors, as I will explain, affect the
pedagogical value of the criminal trials and convictions. First,
by depicting the world as consisting of the innocent and the
guilty, the trials reproduced the authoritarian view that the
world is split between allies and enemies. Second, under this
same bi-polar criterion, those who were not declared guilty were
judged to be innocent of the terror campaign, regardless of their
direct or indirect participation in creating or setting the grounds
that led to state terror. Third, as the trials were necessarily re-
strained in scope, they re-invented history by pinning the blame
43. See generally Paul G. Chevigny, Police Deadly Force as Social Control Jamaica,
Argentina and Brazil, 1 CRIM. L.F. 389, 389-425 (1990) (containing Chevigny's recent re-
search about the relation between police brutality and popular consent to such violence).
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almost entirely on one particular social group: the military. On
the one hand, this process led to the view that only a limited
number of citizens were responsible for the extreme violence. On
the other hand, it led to scapegoating, as members of a social
sector were accused by, among others, those who should have
shared the moral and legal responsibility for supporting the sys-
tematic use of violence. To summarize, the trials' deficiencies
rest with the epistemic function we attach to the criminal courts.
It is on this count that the trials failed to provide a satisfactory
account of what happened, to tell the citizenry who "caused the
suffering" and which are the facts and principles on which the
adjudication is grounded. Based on a sharp division between the
guilty and the innocent, the truth resulting from the criminal
trials is, however, too narrow to become grounds for our building
of history.
An indirect and ironic consequence of the three negative fac-
tors I just specified is that in post-dictatorial, fragmented socie-
ties, human rights trials tend to erode the same democratic
authority that they are devised to restore. The section that fol-
lows deals with the third effect, the notion of blame, and the ob-
vious contradiction of Argentine society-namely, that of ada-
mantly advancing the cause of the trials of perpetrators of
human rights abuses-while simultaneously condoning a similar
violence and supporting those who practice it. I claim that the
seemingly obvious plausibility of setting up the human rights
trials as a means to achieve democratic change in terrorized
communities is likely to be overridden by the negative effects of
such trials which stem from the social practice of blaming.
G. Blaming and State Terror
I have mentioned how state-sponsored violence became a
way of life in the Argentina of the 1970s and, in an ameliorated
version, continues to be one today. Still pending is a brief refer-
ence to political power in an environment in which communica-
tion among citizens-and these citizens and the government-is
seriously distorted by the uncertainty caused by a terrorist state.
It is clear that, far from coordinating the actions of individual
terrorists, state power aims to thwart concerted activities of
those believed to be adversaries. For those who perceive political
reality as a vast, subversive conspiracy, power can only be exer-
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cised by thwarting concerted action, and terror becomes a neces-
sary method for achieving this end.
Terror generates confusion among the populace, and this
confusion inevitably disables the state apparatus to organize the
polity. Indeed, state terror makes the existence of effective, or-
ganizational power relations extremely difficult at best. Admin-
istered from the top, random brutality keeps individuals guess-
ing about what behavior will keep them out of trouble. This
violence dislocates social communication both horizontally
(among the citizenry) and vertically (between the government
and the populace). As the system of threats and offers upon
which standard organizational political power is built begins to
crumble, direct coercion further replaces mere threats of pun-
ishment. The lack of spontaneous compliance based on respect
for authority and the ineffectiveness of ambiguous threats is re-
placed by an increasing use of direct violence. The evidence of
this trend is that the military regime preferred to rule under a
state of siege decreed by Isabel Per6n back in 1983. States of
emergency are devised to justify a considerable dosage of arbi-
trariness in the curtailment of basic liberties. Indeed, the mili-
tary maintained the uncertainty of the state of siege, only lifting
it five years after the army's proclaimed victory over insurgency.
The dictatorship restored the formal rule of law in October 1983,
when the general elections were held.
A terrorist state has little room for articulating individual
actions in the pursuit of common goals. The entire notion of po-
litical power, usually exercised as coordinating the actions of in-
dividuals, is mostly turned into uncertain coercion. This per-
ceived need to resort to violence, along with the thousands of
persons tortured and made to disappear, instilled among the
citizenry the notion (implicit or explicit) that, in Argentina, suf-
fering was an inevitable fact of life. For the population at large,
the inevitability of pain explains the transformation of the ac-
quired practice of blaming from those who cause other people's
suffering to those who were the very victims of brutality. This
practice of blaming the victim constituted a substantial part of a
new ideology developed under the uncertainty of a state of terror.
For most moral and criminal law theorists, blame plays an
important role in the social life of a rights-based community. In
such a community, individuals value their own-and other peo-
ple's--choices of how to live their own lives and are confident
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that institutions will protect their pursuit of personal goals and
ideals from the interference of third parties, including the state
itself. 4 When some individuals break the rules of this society,
causing harm to others, outrage for these acts is converted into
blame. By blaming the transgressors, we foster a sense of moral
responsibility both in the perpetrator and among members of
society at large. Agreement among the citizenry on whom to
blame and for what actions also strengthens solidarity. 45 As a
vehicle of control, blame conveys moral disapproval for harmful
actions and attempts to convert into persuasion the indignation
that these actions arouse. By blaming those who infringe our
rights we are sending a message to society that such actions
ought not to be repeated, while at the same time we are provid-
ing reasons for the wrongdoer to realize that she has betrayed
social values that she also should uphold if she were rational.
6
This ideal form of blame is entrenched in our moral practices in
two ways: first, by denouncing those who break society's rules;
and second, by convincing those who have wronged others that
they deserve our condemnation. Thus, while based on past
events, blame is also forward-looking in that its practice, espe-
cially through criminal punishment, constitutes an incentive for
the transgressors and their potential imitators to respect just in-
stitutions and social values. 47 For this ideal version, blame bol-
sters the moral authoritativeness of legal rules and practices.
This notion of blame, and the punishment that we often connect
to it, is thus only a moral ideal.
Attaching lofty moral overtones to blame assumes that we
can squarely identify those actions that bring about harm. This
process of identifying those morally responsible for harming oth-
ers is typically the case in "guilty" transgressions of the criminal
law. Based on the dichotomy of "guilty" and "innocent," criminal
legislation and practice provide clear parameters within which to
establish which actions are relevant in bringing about certain
harms. Beyond the realm of criminal law, however, the issue of
moral responsibility is, by and large, subject to disagreement,
44. BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 15, at 137-55.
45. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 47-
81 (1990).
46. See T.M. Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 39, 39-104. (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
47. See, e.g., MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
COMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A MORAL POINT OF VIEW 177 (1992).
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negotiation, and constant change.4 While retaining its fagade of
a moral claim, the practice of blaming has shifted from time to
time, as did the notions of causation, harm, and moral respon-
sibility as opposed to simple "accidents" that just happen to us.49
Beyond the practice of the criminal law, explanations that posit
the blame on a single party, "one-factor explanations," are usu-
ally both the source and the consequence of over-simplifying
events. 50 Thus, as a general principle, the more realistically we
think about the origins of suffering, the more we view this suffer-
ing as the outcome of a complex set of circumstances instead of
the result of a single cause. In defining reality as one of friends
and enemies, the authoritarian mind is prone to oversimplifying
the notions of both blame and the "innocent" victim.
A terrorist state drastically modifies the connections be-
tween blame, morality, and the transgression of explicit rules.
Silencing our outrage at brutality becomes a structural feature of
society because conscious indignation against state violence is
both too painful and too dangerous to express to others. Moreo-
ver, the sense of inevitability strips the practice of blaming of its
mission of inhibiting future harmful actions.51 Blame ceases to
be a morally-based mechanism of social control, at least in the
sense of compelling citizens to abide by explicitly agreed-upon
principles and values. As a consequence of this process, Argen-
tine society developed the habit of viewing the victims of repres-
48. Id. at 167.
49. Blame is sensitive to power shifts because the very notion of blame is closely
connected to that of power. Think of the changes power can make in relationship to
seemingly blameless outcomes. Being struck by lightning will normally elicit the verdict
that we were victims of an accident, that we had bad luck. Suppose now that some ex-
tremely powerful individual-the emperor, the Pope-were the victim of the same light-
ning. A set of new evaluative considerations may now change the victim's normative
status and, consequently, our understanding of what happened. We may want to inquire
if those in charge of the victim's security should not have prevented him from exposing
himself to an approaching thunder-storm. We may even blame the host official of the
country for not issuing a timely warning about the country's weather. If this were the
case, we may now want to call it negligent--or consider it even an intentional omission
that put the victim's life at risk. Thus, one may claim, misfortune and injustice will often
depend on power relations between the parties involved. What is then the difference be-
tween the preceding facts and the outcome, other than the victim's power? See, e.g.,
JUDITH N. SCHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1988).
50. PAUL WATZLAWICK ET AL., CHANGE: PRINCIPLES OF MORAL FORMATION AND
PROBLEM RESOLUTION 45 (1974).
51. For the concept of harm, I propose the basic notion of curtailing someone's per-
sonal autonomy, offending her dignity, and causing pain above a certain threshold. See
CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1991).
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sion as the object of blame. In essence, Argentines shifted the
focus of their anguish from the perpetrators to the victims. The
terrorist regime had, in Barrington Moore's words,
"expropriated" the citizen's moral outrage.52
This seemingly strange practice of transferring the object of
blame on to the victim is impeccably described by CONADEP 53 in
the prologue of Nunca Mas:
In the society, the idea of un-protection became increasingly
entrenched, the dark fear that anybody, no matter how inno-
cent, could fall victim to that infinite witch hunt. Some were
absorbed by overwhelming fear, while others were controlled
by the conscious or unconscious proclivity to justify horror: 'It
must be something s/he must have done, was the whisper, as
wanting to favor inscrutable Gods, looking at the children or
parents of the disappeared as if they were pest-ridden. These
sentiments were vacillating, because it was known that so
many had been swallowed up by that bottomless abyss with-
out being guilty of anything; because, carried out with the
drift that characterizes the hunting of witches and the pos-
sessed, the struggle against the 'subversive' had been turned
into a dementedly generalized repression. Because the epithet
'subversive' had such a vast and unpredictable reach.54
Many Argentines now remember how in 1976, society devel-
oped the generalized practice of understanding violence by look-
ing at the victim rather than the perpetrator.55 The standard
practice of blaming the victim for some unspecified conjectural
involvement in "something" can be compared to the chauvinistic
male's description of rape as a process in which the woman's se-
ductive role is essential to her plight. A woman may be sus-
pected of "causing" the rape by seeming to express her sexual
desire. Thus, this form of blame fed into the well-known
52. BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASIS OF OBEDIENCE AND
REVOLT 500 (1978).
53. CONADEP was the acronym of the National Commission for the Disappearance
of Individuals set up by President Alfonsin soon after stepping into office in December
1993.
54. Prologue to NUNCA MAS: INFORMS DE LA COMISION NAcIONAL SOBRE LA
DESPARACION DE PERSONAS 9 (14th ed. 1986).
55. This point is made, for instance, by Marcelo Suarez-Horozco, The Grammar of
Terror: Psychocultural Responses to State Terrorism in Dirty War and Post-Dirty War
Argentina, in THE PATHS OF DOMINATION, RESISTANCE AND TERROR 219-59 (Carolyn
Nordstrom & JoAnn Martin eds., 1992).
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authoritarian view that the notion of "human rights" was an in-
strument to serve the interests of those who threatened the
"fatherland's basic values." Only those who sympathized with
subversion would condemn the regime, or even worse, lobby at
foreign and international human rights forums against the mili-
tary rule. After all, the Argentine community itself had realized
that only the ill-intentioned, the reckless, and the stupid were
the objects of torture and assassination.
By instilling among the citizenry a bipolar interpretation of
the world as one of "the guilty" and "the innocent," the criminal
trials recreated a bipolar scheme akin to that of "if you are not
with us you are against us." As the vague notion of "subversive"
had split society into the good and the bad, this same society was
divided once more by institutionalized blame. What had for-
merly been "subversives" versus "crusaders," had, in the social
environment of the mid-1980s, been split into the dichotomy of
the "guilty" versus the "innocent," on the basis of formalized
criminal blame. Paradoxically, the most attractive feature about
the trials-establishing one common truth by limiting the rele-
vant facts to those applicable to criminal guilt and innocence-
was also their greatest weakness. This weakness was the inevi-
table over-simplification of history as one for which there was no
middle ground between the innocent and the guilty.
When grounded in the procurement of self-respect and con-
fidence, blame leads us to attempt to convince violators that they
injured us, preventing them and potential imitators from harm-
ing us again. Within the Argentine context, the practice of
blaming arose from sentiments other than those of self-respect
and confidence. By persuading the wrongdoer that he betrayed
our values, this conception of blame implies that we treat trans-
gressors as moral agents, that we deal with them as our equals,
who deserve that we furnish reasons for our indignation. There
is one condition to render blaming those who harm us a moral
practice: that we submit our reasons to those we blame, and en-
gage in an exchange of views with them.56 Unlike this practice,
by placing the fault with the disappeared and the murdered as a
class different from ours, blamers lose their claim to prevail
morally in the exchange of reasons; they forfeit their claim to be
56. Few authors have emphasized the moral value of deliberation as does Carlos
Nino. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
107-43 (1996).
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morally right. Also at variance with moral blaming, vengeful re-
sentment does not require from us that we supply convincing
reasons for our causing pain to those we blame. In the Argen-
tina of the 1970s, this social practice served the purpose of suit-
ing the self-interest of the blamers. In a bid to lessen our an-
guish and frustration, the use of blame became an implicit way
to circumscribe the violence within a defined social group. Like
our blaming the disappeared, in post-Dirty War Argentina, our
blame was focused upon a group segregated from our own com-
munity; the population shifted its focus to the military as the
single-factor explanation of our suffering. In the 1970s, blame
was neither an expression of moral indignation nor a means to
single out those who used violence against our lives and freedom.
Blaming consisted, instead, of the result of (unilaterally) ma-
nipulating our deeply rooted retributive emotions to achieve
three possible outcomes. First, blame made us feel less guilty for
failing to succor the direct victims of brutality. Second, it neu-
tralized the shame that resulted from our giving up our
"dangerous" association with the politically undesirable because
it was their "undesirability" that made them unworthy. After
all, blame had driven us to believe that their suffering was the
consequence of their defective character. Third, blame neutral-
ized our anguish. By conceiving chastisement as grounded in
some of the victims' distinct properties or deeds, we muffled the
terror that we would be next on the hit lists. We were, after all,
different from those who suffered. Only in the sense of stifling
widely shared guilt, shame and anguish in the common knowl-
edge that it was the same disappeared who we ought to censure
did blame contribute to some form of social solidarity. We
turned blame into a short-cut to seek relief from fear, remorse,
and impotence.
III. FORWARD INTO THE PAST OR BACKWARDS TO THE FUTURE
It now seems clear that the common desire to have the mili-
tary punished expressed the qualified, though popularly-felt
need to promote social solidarity. The current appeal of police
violence and the electoral success of key figures of the military
regime strengthens my own belief that the pursuit of punish-
ment is unrelated to promoting the dignity of individuals. The
retributive emotions behind the rallies and public protests were
aimed at achieving a kind of social solidarity the country had ex-
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perienced during the apogee of the military regime. In 1978, for
example, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo were widely scolded for
damaging the country's international "image" during the soccer
World Cup held in Argentina. During the soccer event the scene
of the Madres' processions to denounce the disappearance of
their children was seen as close to treason. Viewed as similarly
perfidious were the interloping international human rights or-
ganizations, prying into the country's affairs in 1979, driving an
aggravated population to boast its disapproval with car stickers
that said "Los Argentinos somos derechos y humanos" ("We Ar-
gentines are humane and right"). The campaign in the 1980s to
punish military officers must be regarded in the same light.
Even if the popular sentiments behind the trials did not
stem from the citizens' sense of justice, or from recovering indi-
viduals' dignity and responsibility, one may suggest that holding
these trials was preferable to sheer passivity. While doing
nothing confirmed our impotence, the community was able to
convey its power by bringing military officers to trial. Members
of the community, one may assume, are more likely to learn
about their rights from "humbling" those who humiliated them.5 7
There are however considerable drawbacks to the strategy of
humbling trials. By zeroing in almost exclusively on a relatively
small and defined number of human rights abusers, the trials
threatened to become the formal instrument to thwart the basic
logic on which we build the notion of responsibility. As a direct
consequence of the criminal trials, formalized vengeful blame ab-
solved many civilians who had supported the military dictator-
ship in the belief that they were not among the blamed but
rather among the accusers. Based on the criminal justice's bipo-
lar logic on "innocent" and "guilty," the trials contributed to the
widely shared conviction that those not prosecuted were simply
innocent.
Thus, the negative side of the trials constituted a dilemma.
First, the expedient of responsibility through the expedient of
considering that a vast sector of society had been responsible for
the brutality diluted responsibility. This meant that turning the
trials into a theater in which, by picking out a varied assortment
of representative citizens, society was punishing itself by trying
57. For a similar approach, see HANNAH ARENDT, A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL: EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 226 (1963).
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mere samples of a very wide variety of citizens: if everybody is
responsible, then nobody really is. I refer here specifically to
pressing charges against thousands of civilians and military ac-
tors who supported, encouraged, or in many ways strengthened
the fanaticism that led to the brutality of the Dirty War. The
second alternative would be to (as Argentines have done) punish
only a few violators for what we considered to be distinctly hor-
rendous infringements on other people's rights. In this case,
most former allies of the accused military were free to become
accusers themselves. Indeed, those who supported the regime
until the financial debacle in 1979, or the 1982 Malvi-
nas/Falkland Islands fiasco, saw themselves as being entitled to
become accusers. This perceived betrayal by their former allies
confirmed the military conspiratorial theory. They now viewed
themselves threatened by an even larger number of conspirators
who had posed as their allies until it became advantageous to
turn against the armed forces. These former allies were now
supporting the politics of revenge. Indeed, the military felt that,
having been encouraged by the citizenry to annihilate
"subversion," to restore order, they had now become repositories
of all the violence in the country since the beginning of the
1970s. Society's authoritarian single-cause explanation of the
sources of its distress consisted no longer in blaming the victims;
the single cause was now the military.5 8 This prevalent readi-
ness to turn against the military may have contributed to Ex-
General Videla's claim, in 1993, in which he repeated his long-
held conviction that he was a scapegoat.59
The military felt that the cruelty of many civilians as well as
their vast pro-dictatorial support had been overlooked and that
all the brutality of recent times had come to be laid at their door.
Remorse, shame, and even simple reflection, were all swamped
by the bitterness of being pinpointed, as they presumed, merely
for being members of the armed forces. The sense of being laden
freed these officers from a minimal sense of moral responsibility
58. In spite of President Alfonsin's instructions to prosecute a very small number of
ERP and Montonero militants, many of whom had by that time been made to disappear
or had fled the country, there was a general atmosphere of obliviousness of right- (and
left-) wing civilians directly or indirectly involved in the violence. Among these indi-
viduals were top politicians, trade union leaders and other ultra-right-wing civilians who
had earlier engaged in extreme violence together with Peron's underling, Jos6 Lopez
Rega.
59. See James Neilson, Parque Jurdsico, NOTICIAS (Buenos Aires), July 18, 1993.
1998]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
for what they had actually ordered and done. The perception of
betrayal by former allies, now turned into accusers, overshad-
owed the civilian government's emphasis that the trials did not
address the military as such but only those responsible for con-
cocting the ruthless campaign or for committing abhorrent
crimes. Thus, as the means of instilling a basic sense of individ-
ual responsibility, the bipolar nature of the criminal trials im-
paired the politics behind the trials.
The persistence of single-factor explanations suggests-as
corroborated by the recent Patti case-that the populace will
again support a dictatorial intervention if the country's back-
ground conditions deteriorate. The electoral appeal of General
Bussi and Colonel Ruiz-Palacios also suggests that the desire for
a tough hand to reinstate social order may be as strong now as it
was back in the 1970s. The single-cause approach to reality in-
vites an analogy between the 1970s subversives and 1990s prop-
erty offenders. The cases in which children and youngsters are
killed for posing petty threats to private property, and the police
and judicial reactions to these episodes, can only be explained
with the assistance of a bipolar logic. This logic is based on the
still reigning "if you are not with us you are against us" approach
to reality and its corollary, the single-cause approach to socially
complex events.
The single-cause approach basically disregards the obvious
fact that the military dictatorship and everything that went with
it had been a phenomenon isolated from the "real country."60
Present tolerance of violence indicates that the collective drive to
punish military abusers did not sufficiently promote respect for
persons as an indispensable ingredient of "actual, unprejudiced
punishment," and as a means of attaining a rights-based democ-
racy. Placing the blame on a single sector of society had per-
ceived "advantages." By refusing to accept the painful fact that
terror originated in the very entrails of the community, the sin-
gle-factor mechanism enabled the populace to stifle both their
guilt and their shame for their passivity toward the suffering. It
is readily apparent that looking at the pain as the consequence of
the activities of a well-defined sector means rewriting the recent
history of Argentina. In some sense, the guilt of many military
officers for the terror they caused does eliminate the appeal of
60. See id.
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their claim of being scapegoated. However, beside the shameful
deeds of many officers there stand no less shameful actions of
many civilians.
To challenge the interpretation of the country's recent past
by exposing the nature of the cause of brutality invites question-
ing the very motives behind the massive support of the human
rights trials. It seems clear that, whatever its strength, credence
in the courts did not rest on the prospects of an impartial deci-
sion of the criminal responsibility of military officers. Present
lack of respect for the courts' verdicts stems from a general be-
lief, leaving no room for judicial independence. For instance, it is
difficult to imagine the popular reaction if Ex-Generals Videla
and Camps had been acquitted as a consequence of the evidence
that they had, for instance, ignored what was happening under
their noses or that they were mentally handicapped. It seems
that the authority of the courts did not rest on the popular re-
spect for their judgment, but rather, on their ability to formalize,
in the best possible legal style, a previous political decision to
put some officers away. The sentences, then, may have allayed
widespread retributive emotions, but said nothing meaningful
about the truth of recent history.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is much to be said for and against the post-dictatorial
criminal trials. Arguments based on politics and policy, prag-
matism and idealism, present and future, have been presented
on both sides and there are surely still more points to be made.
Punishing members of certain groups, as it stands today, is
highly intermixed with the less accepted concept of revenge. The
strategy of impunity, however, is highly counter-intuitive and
cannot be argued for without a strong sense of insincerity. If
pressed for one, an answer to this plight may lie half-way be-
tween punishing a group of officers-at the risk of facing the sec-
ond horn of the dilemma-and not punishing anybody at all.
Perhaps lighter sentences to a larger sample of members of the
community that includes business-people, technocrats, religious
persons and professionals would provide a more accurate picture
of what happened. This solution would be plausible if-and only
if-we could come up with good moral reasons for singling these
people out, thus avoiding the first horn of the dilemma. Perhaps
the latter strategy provides a clearer picture of those involved in
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planning and executing horrendous crimes against groups of in-
dividuals. By and large, experience indicates that the high ex-
pectations posited in the trials will be frustrated sooner or later.
The issue demands further thinking about the democratic mind
and the role of the criminal justice system.
